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817 
MANUFACTURING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE: THE SOMALILAND-PUNTLAND 
DISPUTE AND UTI POSSIDETIS 
INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he bias [in] existing law is towards stability, the status quo, and the 
present effective possession; the tendency of international courts is to let 
sleeping dogs lie. This is right, for the stability of territorial boundaries 
must always be the ultimate aim.”1 This sentiment asserted by Professor 
Jennings is certainly valid regarding internationally recognized nation-
states.
2
 In other cases, however, international courts must “devise a legal 
regime” to solve border disputes among unrecognized territories,3 
commonly referred to as “de facto states” or “quasi-states.”4 Yet, quasi-
states are currently unable to procure declarative judgments from the 
institution that traditionally governs border disputes, the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”).5 
Somaliland, being a quasi-state, is therefore unable to petition the ICJ 
for a resolution to its border dispute with Puntland.
6
 The international 
community, however, has a demonstrated interest in resolving this 
quarrel,
7
 as Somaliland and Puntland are fairly stable bourgeoning 
 
 
 1. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (1963). 
 2. “[I]n a properly ordered society, territorial boundaries will be among the most stable of all 
institutions.” Id. 
 3. “It is in [disputed frontiers] that international law needs to extend its influence and sway, and 
in order to do that it will be necessary to devise legal regimes sufficiently flexible to permit of the 
adjustments to shifting patterns of international power that may be needed for a long time to come.” Id. 
 4. See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 129–33. 
 7. The United States has recently increased aid to Somaliland and Puntland for employment, 
development, and infrastructure. Hussein Yusuf, America looks to Puntland and Somaliland, THE 
DAILY STAR (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Oct/14/America-
looks-to-Puntland-and-Somaliland.ashx#axzz2GHA1BrFp (“[T]his policy change allows the United 
States . . . to provide a foundation for long-lasting change through . . . infrastructure, economic 
development and security.”). The Somaliland president has also been invited to visit the United States 
in order to strengthen international relations between the two governments. US Government Officially 
Invites Somaliland President, SOMALILAND PRESS (Dec. 28, 2010), http://somalilandpress.com/us-
government-officially-invites-somaliland-president-19609 (‘“The President [of Somalia] has accepted 
the invitation from the US government and that the visit will be fixed at jointly agreed date.”’). 
Finally, Somaliland, Ethiopia and China have recently negotiated several economic agreements to 
facilitate oil and gas trading between the nations. Somaliland, Ethiopia and China to Sign Trilateral 
Deals, SOMALILAND PRESS (Aug. 14, 2011), http://somalilandpress.com/somaliland-ethiopia-and-
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democracies, while their “parent state,” Somalia, exists in utter disarray.8 
Somalia’s internal government has been consistently marred with severe 
corruption,
9
 resulting in an austere lack of international credibility
10
 and 
pervasive bouts of civil violence.
11
 This Note argues that the most logical 
resolution to the clashes between Somaliland and Puntland can be found in 
the ICJ’s legal mechanisms for solving international border disputes, most 
notably uti possidetis.
12
 The Court’s jurisprudence can be applied to render 
a temporary ruling on the location of Somaliland’s frontier, with the 
prospect of stabilizing the disputed territory until a permanent solution is 
developed for co-existence with a federalized Somalia. 
Part I of this Note will begin by exploring the territorial history of 
Somalia. Part II will introduce quasi-states and their treatment within the 
international community. Part III will detail the legal regime used by the 
ICJ to solve border disputes, specifically the doctrine of uti possidetis. 
Finally, Part IV will apply the ICJ’s border-resolving mechanisms to the 
Somaliland-Puntland dispute.  
 
 
china-to-sign-trilateral-deals-23306 (“[S]omaliland, Ethiopia and China are expected to sign trilateral 
agreements on gas, oil and logistic deals in the days ahead.”); see also infra note 10. 
 8. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stated: “We think that [Somaliland and 
Puntland] have been zones of relative political and civil stability, and we think they will, in fact, be a 
bulwark against extremism and radicalism that might emerge from [southern Somalia].” SOMALIA: 
Somaliland and Puntland to Cooperate on Security, INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORK (Sept. 28, 
2010), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=90607. 
 Due to military conflict in the Sool region of Somalia, “Somaliland and Puntland risk the loss of 
their most important asset—their relative peacefulness in comparison with the situation in the south of 
Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu.” Markus V. Hoehne, Puntland and Somaliland Clashing in 
Northern Somalia: Who Cuts the Gordian Knot?, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL 1 (Nov. 7, 2007), 
http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hoehne. 
 9. Maro Silva, Somalia: State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to International Law, 50 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 553, 558 (2010) (“[T]he only defining characteristics of the Somali government are 
corruption and criminality.”). 
 10. Most recently, on February 3, 2011, Somalia’s parliament voted to extend its self-imposed 
mandate to run Somalia. This unilateral decision has spurred international dissent from the United 
Nations, United States, and the United Kingdom. See Alex Thurston, Somalia Transitional Parliament 
Extends Term Three Years, Prompting Criticism, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0207/Somalia-transitional-parliament-
extends-term-three-years-prompting-criticism; see also Statement by the EU High Representative 
Catherine Ashton on the decision of Somalia Parliament, GAROWE ONLINE (Feb. 4th, 2011), 
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Press_Releases_32/Statement_by_the_EU_High_Repr
esentative_Catherine_Ashton_on_the_decision_of_Somali_Parliament.shtml (“The decision [to extend 
the mandate] was taken hurriedly without appropriate consultations on the way forward.”). 
 11. “The lack of central governance has also facilitated the formation of small fiefdoms. 
Inherently unstable, the fiefdoms often experience rapid transitions in leadership. For example, in the 
capital city of Mogadishu, multiple groups compete and have competed politically and militarily for 
neighborhoods and even particular streets.” Silva, supra note 9, at 558. 
 12. See infra notes 70–87 and accompanying text. 
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2012] THE SOMALILAND-PUNTLAND DISPUTE AND UTI POSSIDETIS 819 
 
 
 
 
I. A BRIEF TERRITORIAL HISTORY OF SOMALIA 
A. Colonial Somalia 
In order to adequately examine Somalia’s history of territory and 
politics, one must become familiar with its clan system.
13
 There are five 
major clan families dispersed throughout several overlapping ethnic and 
administrative regions in Somalia.
14
 The clans especially pertinent to this 
Note are the Isaq
15
 and the Harti.
16
 The territorial dissemination of these 
clan families inevitably resulted in their initial citizenship among the 
European powers that began colonizing African lands in the late 
nineteenth century through both peaceful and violent means.
17
 
Following the battle of Adowa in 1896,
18
 Britain,
19
 France,
20
 Italy,
21
 
and Ethiopia
22
 demarcated colonial borders in Somalia.
23
 These borders 
 
 
 13. For a detailed diagram of the Somali Clan Structure, see MARIA H. BRONS, SOCIETY, 
SECURITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATE IN SOMALIA: FROM STATELESSNESS TO STATELESSNESS? 
18–19 (2001). Membership in Somali clans ultimately determines social and political relationships and 
has been instrumental in shaping the separate identities of Somaliland, Puntland, and the remainder of 
Somalia. Id. at 98. The southern clans initially derived from the Sab lineage and are characterized as a 
“settled farming” community. Id. at 99. The northern clans (where present-day Somaliland and 
Puntland are located) derived from the Samale and practiced “nomadic pastoralism.” Id. The northern 
clans traveled throughout the region with their animal herds to the most fertile areas, generally 
depending on rain patterns. Id. at 79. Because of the resulting territorial separation, the two sects 
developed different languages. Id. at 99. These distinctions, present far before European colonialism, 
were early factors that contributed to the Somali civil war. See I.M. LEWIS, A PASTORAL DEMOCRACY: 
A STUDY OF PASTORALISM AND POLITICS AMONG THE NORTHERN SOMALI OF THE HORN OF AFRICA 
(1961). 
 14. The five clan families are Dir, Isaq (or Isaaq), Darod (or Darood), Hawiye, and Rewin. 
BRONS, supra note 13, at 101–03. The population was roughly distributed as such: 35% Darod, 23% 
Hawiye, 23% Isaaq, 7% Dir, and 11% Rewin. DEON GELDENHUYS, CONTESTED STATES IN WORLD 
POLITICS 129 (2009); see also infra Maps 1(A)–1(B), pp. 840–41 (territorial clan distribution in 
comparison to modern-day Somaliland and Puntland locations), printed in BRONS, supra note 13, at 
15, 17. 
 15. The Isaq are located in Northwest Somalia, which is present-day Somaliland. BRONS, supra 
note 13, at 103. 
 16. The Harti are a sub-clan of the widely dispersed Darod family and are located in Northeast 
Somalia, which is present-day Puntland. Id. at 102. The Harti family is broken down into several sub-
clans comprised of the Majertain in the northeast and the Dulbahante and Warsangeli located further 
west. Id. Certain western portions of Dulbahante and Warsangeli territory adjoin Isaq territory. Id. 
 17. See MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 27–
58 (1986) (detailing modes of European territorial acquisition in Africa). 
 18. British forces and their Italian allies were seeking to push French and Russian forces out of 
Somalia, primarily in order to maintain access to the Nile. IOAN LEWIS, UNDERSTANDING SOMALIA 
AND SOMALILAND: CULTURE, HISTORY, SOCIETY 28–29 (2008). The competing powers had initially 
sought to take control of Ethiopia, which borders Somalia to the west, by providing the Ethiopians 
with weapons. Id. Ethiopian forces, however, independently joined the battle of Adowa and 
successfully defeated Italian forces, thus installing Ethiopia as a “local superpower” within Africa. Id. 
With newfound power, Italy, France, and Great Britain approached Ethiopia individually with 
territorial peace offerings. S. PIERRE PETRIDES, THE BOUNDARY QUESTION BETWEEN ETHIOPIA & 
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would essentially remain intact
24
 until the conclusion of World War II.
25
 
Following the United Nations’ post-war negotiations with Ethiopia, Great 
Britain, and Italy, it was agreed that Great Britain would retain its original 
territory in the Northwest as a separate entity
26
 while Italy would control 
the remainder of its former colony in the East.
27
 This demarcation and the 
 
 
SOMALIA: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC SURVEY WITH 20 MAPS 16 (1983); see also PAOLO TRIPODI, 
THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN SOMALIA 22–25 (1999) (discussing in depth Italy’s dealings with Ethiopia 
before and after the battle of Adowa).  
 19. Great Britain had previously established the “Protectorate of British Somaliland” in July 
1887 after negotiating with several Somali families and clans, including the Isaq. BRONS, supra note 
13, at 131–32. During negotiations following the battle, Britain was required to cede a portion of this 
protectorate to Ethiopia. Id. at 135. The resulting Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty was successfully 
implemented in 1898 and demarcated British Somaliland from Ethiopia’s newly acquired territory. 
PETRIDES, supra note 18, at 26; see also infra Map 2(A), p. 842 (British Somaliland boundary 
agreements), printed in Id. at 26–27. Based on the agreement, Britain transferred a segment of its 
southwestern territory that had originally been subject to the 1894 Anglo-Italian Protocol to Ethiopia. 
Id. (text and accompanying map). 
 20. The French were left with territory to the west of British Somaliland and established the 
Republic of Djibouti. SCOTT PEGG, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE DE FACTO STATE 87 (1998). In 
order to appease Ethiopia, France signed the Treaty of Friendship and Trade which adjusted France’s 
western border and allowed Ethiopia “unrestricted and untaxed import and transit of arms and 
ammunitions as well as goods of every kind through Djibouti.” PETRIDES, supra note 18, at 18 (text 
and accompanying map). 
 21. Italy was provided with a majority of the southern coast. PEGG, supra note 20, at 87; see also 
infra Map 2(B), p. 842 (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rossetti’s Map of 1910), printed in 
PETRIDES, supra note 18, at 78–79. 
 22. The Ethiopians, in total, gained the central Ogaden region of Somalia (south of the British 
and west of the Italians). PEGG, supra note 20, at 87. 
 23. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 29. 
 24. The word “essentially” is used because Italy and Ethiopia were unable to come to an official 
agreement on the border demarcation question during the aforementioned negotiations in the late 
1800s. PETRIDES, supra note 18, at 29–39. Temporary resolution was achieved following a brief 
skirmish between Italian and Ethiopian forces in December 1907, after which the two powers signed 
the 1908 Italo-Ethiopian Boundary Convention. Id. at 44. The resulting border demarcation required 
by the convention, however, was never fully implemented. BRONS, supra note 13, at 136 (“[T]he 
actual demarcation of the border began, but was interrupted and then never continued—a failing for 
which different schools of thought blame either the Ethiopians . . . or the Italians . . . .”). 
 25. The inadequacy of border stability between Italy and Ethiopia allowed fascist Italian forces to 
move into Ethiopian territory and attack Wal-Wal in 1935, leading to the founding of “Somalia 
Italiana.” BRONS, supra note 13, at 144–45. After the Italians invaded Ethiopia, they shifted their 
efforts towards removing the British presence in Northern Somalia and temporarily succeeded, thereby 
creating a total hegemony. Id. The British regained the territory from Italy in 1941, however, following 
several battles in the Horn of Africa. Id.; see also LEWIS, supra note 18, at 31. 
 26. For details on the social and economic circumstances of the British Protectorate of 
Somaliland, see GREAT BRITAIN COLONIAL OFFICE, SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE: REPORT FOR THE 
YEARS 1956 AND 1957 (1959) [hereinafter SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE REPORT FOR 1956]; GREAT 
BRITAIN COLONIAL OFFICE, SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE: REPORT FOR THE YEARS 1958 AND 1959 
(1960) [hereinafter SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE REPORT FOR 1958]. 
 27. In 1949, the United Nations General Assembly voted on a “[r]esolution ‘recommending’ that 
Somalia should be an independent and sovereign state after a period of 10 years of United Nations 
Trusteeship, with Italy as administrative authority.” PETRIDES, supra note 18, at 56. It was passed in 
1950 with the caveat that “the boundaries of the future independent state of Somalia would be ‘those 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/3
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subsequent colonial administrations
28
 contributed greatly to the major 
conflicts between Somaliland and Puntland. 
B. Temporary Independence, Civil War, and a New Somaliland 
As the United Nations agreement required,
29
 decolonization in 
Somaliland and Somalia was set to commence in 1960.
30
 Due to 
administrative differences, the British Somaliland Protectorate was 
granted independence from Great Britain on June 26, 1960,
31
 while the 
Somalia Trusteeship became independent from Italy on July 1, 1960.
32
 For 
those five days, Somaliland and Somalia existed as separate entities. The 
two states then effectively merged and became known simply as Somalia. 
There is contention over the legality of this process, especially among the 
Somaliland population. In fact, half of northern Somali citizens (formerly 
of British Somaliland) voted in a provisional referendum against the new 
constitution that purported to unite the former colonies.
33
 
 
 
already fixed by international agreement’” and that “‘[t]he portion of its boundaries with Ethiopia, not 
already delimited . . . be delimited.’” Id. Great Britain ultimately retained the “British Somaliland 
Protectorate,” while the majority of Ogaden territory west of Italy’s Trusteeship was returned to 
Ethiopia. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 32. 
 28. For a map detailing the British and Italian territories of Somalia, see BRONS, supra note 13, 
at 13. Britain also took control of the former French territory of Djibouti, northwest of the original 
British Protectorate. Id. 
 29. See supra note 27. 
 30. PEGG, supra note 20, at 87. Italy, eager to divest itself of its commitments in the tumultuous 
Somali society, sought earlier decolonization in November 1959. Over the next six months, Somali 
politicians began drafting a constitution and preparing for independence in response to the request. 
TRIPODI, supra note 18, at 99. 
 31. GREAT BRITAIN COLONIAL OFFICE, REPORT ON THE SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE 11 (1960). 
 32. Great Britain was under the impression that southern Somalia would become independent 
when Italy’s Trusteeship agreement ran out in December 1960 and saw “justification for proceeding 
with constitutional development in the Protectorate at a faster pace than they believe[d] to be suitable 
or advantageous in more normal circumstances elsewhere.” Id. at 13. British authorities thus planned 
for Somaliland to develop independently and then, if desired, it could “determine the terms and 
conditions on which a closer association of the two territories might be achieved.” Id. at 14. The 
United Nations, however, subsequently moved Somalia’s independence date up five months from its 
original date of December 2, 1960. PEGG, supra note 20, at 87.  
 33. MARK BRADBURY, AFRICAN ISSUES: BECOMING SOMALILAND 33 (2008). Somaliland passed 
“the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law” on June 27, 1960. Id. at 33 n.13. Somalia did not ratify 
this specific law, however, and instead passed its own “Act of Union.” PEGG, supra note 20, at 87. One 
year later, these two competing laws were repealed and a new “Act of Union” was ratified with 
retroactive effect. Id. The new Act has since been challenged by northern Somaliland citizens, 
especially those of the Isaq clan who lost much of their political power after the unification. 
BRADBURY, supra, at 33; see also LEWIS, supra note 18, at 35 (discussing the June 20, 1961 
referendum). 
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Following the Somali unification, former Somaliland citizens were not 
adequately represented
34
 in the almost uniformly biased central 
government,
35
 with northern political alienation intensifying after Major-
General Mohamed Siyad Barre led a successful military coup in 1969.
36
 In 
response, members of the Isaq clan in northern regions
37
 formed a 
resistance party known as the Somali National Movement (“SNM”).38 
Clashes between government security forces and the SNM led to a Somali 
civil war that eventually drove Barre out of the country in 1991.
39
 A rival 
faction quickly installed itself as the de facto Somali government, 
however, angering the Isaq clan and ultimately influencing the SNM’s 
decision to secede.
40
 The SNM and a collective of northern clans met in 
Berbera to discuss the idea of an independent Somaliland
41
 and formally 
declared independence
42
 in May 1991 at the Burco “Grand Conference of 
 
 
 34. “[Somali] political parties fell into three basic categories: the party that provided the majority 
throughout the first decade of independence and was dominated by Southern clans; the minority 
opposition parties based on clan affiliation from the North . . . and thirdly a number of ad hoc parties 
. . . . [T]he multi-party democratic state structure deteriorated into a de facto one-party state.” BRONS, 
supra note 13, at 162. 
 35. There was, however, a brief respite in northern political alienation “in June 1967 under the 
premiership of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal [of the Isaq clan], a northerner from the former British 
Protectorate.” LEWIS, supra note 18, at 37. 
 36. BRADBURY, supra note 33, at 35–36. “Barre systematically favored loyal southern clans 
while severely discriminating against the majority clan-family in the north, the Isaaq.” MARC WELLER 
& KATHERINE NOBBS, ASYMMETRIC AUTONOMY AND THE SETTLEMENT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS 281 
(2010). Government forces under Barre’s leadership also perpetrated human rights abuses, including 
“executions, rape, and [destruction of access to food and water].” BRONS, supra note 13, at 186 (citing 
AFRICA WATCH, SOMALIA. A GOVERNMENT AT WAR WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE. TESTIMONIES ABOUT 
THE KILLINGS AND THE CONFLICT IN THE NORTH 8 (1990)). These violations became worse once 
Barre declared a state of emergency, which effectively gave “[military and security forces] unlimited 
power over the lives of civilians and led to violent excesses as a matter of policy.” Id. at 187. 
 37. After 1975, the government split Somalia into several administrative regions. For a detailed 
map of these regions, see BRONS, supra note 13, at 16. 
 38. PEGG, supra note 20, at 88.  
 39. WELLER, supra note 36, at 281. 
 40. The SNM had been fighting alongside the Somali Patriotic Movement (“SPM”) (composed 
of citizens from the Ogaden region), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (“SSDF”) (composed of 
Darod clan members), and the United Somali Congress (“USC”) (composed of Hawiye clan 
members). GELDENHUYS, supra note 14, at 130–31. Immediately after driving Barre out of Villa 
Somalia, the USC declared itself the interim Somali government, with Ali Mahdi Mohamed as its 
president. BRONS, supra note 13, at 213. While the SNM initially wanted to remain in a unified 
Somalia, the USC’s unilateral decision changed their position. Id. at 246. Secessionist intentions had 
perhaps been present even before political usurpation by the USC, because “in view of the magnitude 
of atrocities committed by a regime that many identified with the postcolonial state of Somalia as such, 
many Isaaq started to believe that the true aim of the [Somali civil war] was independence.” WELLER, 
supra note 36, at 281.  
 41. BRONS, supra note 13, at 246. The original purpose of the conference was relatively 
compliant, as “no mention was made in Berbera of secession, although talk of revising the 1960 act of 
union may have alluded to a future federal constitution.” BRADBURY, supra note 33, at 80. 
 42. The Conference named the newly formed State the “Republic of Somaliland.” Id. at 82. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/3
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the Northern Peoples,”43 with a resolution44 that based its territory on the 
original colonial borders inherited from the British.
45
 The conference 
predicated the new territorial borders on the notion that the Act of Union 
was not properly passed, and thus, post-colonial British Somaliland and 
Italian Somalia were never truly a unified state, which provided a legal 
basis for their resolution.
46
 Subsequent negotiations between the two states 
have since been futile.
47
 
C. The Puntland State of Somalia 
In 1997, the remaining factions in Somalia met to formulate a new 
Somali state structure.
48
 The northeast territory, primarily composed of the 
Harti clan and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (“SSDF”), was 
provisionally known as Puntland.
49
 After observing the administrative 
disorganization in the southern Somali territories,
50
 Puntland 
representatives instead sought to establish the territory as an autonomous 
regional state, though they did not seek independence or international 
recognition.
51
 In slight contrast to the SNM in Somaliland, the SSDF was 
 
 
 43. Those in attendance included “the senior elders of the Isaaq, Harti, and Dir clans and the 
leadership of the SNM . . . .” Id. at 80.  
 44. “Resolutions of [the] Burco Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples [included]: 
[1] Reconciliation of the warring parties to the conflict . . . [2] Declaration of the creation of the 
Republic of Somaliland . . . [3] The establishment of an SNM government for two years and the 
accommodation of the non-Isaaq communities in the government . . . [4] Initiation of a separate 
reconciliation process for [the] Sanaag Region.” Id. at 82. 
 45. BRONS, supra note 13, at 257.  
 46. “The Somaliland authorities have asserted that the decision in Burco was not an act of 
secession per se, but a ‘voluntary dissolution between sovereign states’ based on the perception by one 
of the parties that the union had failed.” BRADBURY, supra note 33, at 83; see also LEWIS, supra note 
18, at 75. 
 47. Mohamed Hassan, Somaliland’s ambassador to Ethiopia stated: “We don’t know who to talk 
to now in Somalia . . . . There is no central government. They are so fragmented. They have been 
killing and killing and killing and oppressing. The people of Somaliland have enjoyed peace, security 
and democracy, and they’re confident they can continue.” Jason McLure, The Troubled Horn of 
Africa: Can the War-torn Region Be Stabilised?, 3 CQ GLOBAL RESEARCHER 149, 158 (2009). 
 48. The “Sodere initiative” urged for Somalia to be split up into five federal regions. Somaliland 
was not involved in the negotiations, however, as the South realized it “should first come to peace and 
stability and bring its own house in order before it could approach the North [Somaliland] for a 
possible confederation.” BRONS, supra note 13, at 268–69. 
 49. The Puntland territory also contained “Warsangeli and Dulbahante territories which [then 
belonged] to Somaliland.” BRONS, supra note 13, at 269. 
 50. See supra notes 8–11. Puntland authorities sought to insulate themselves from these 
problems, though not permanently, as “[Article] 1(4) of the [Charter of Puntland State of Somalia] 
committed Puntland to recreate Somalia as a federal state.” WELLER, supra note 36, at 283. 
 51. BRONS, supra note 13, at 269–72. Puntland did not opt for secessionist independence or 
international recognition like Somaliland. Instead, it became a self-enforcing region of Somalia with 
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unable to cohesively install itself as Puntland’s interim government, and as 
such, the State primarily relied on clan leadership.
52
 Because “ethnic” clan 
borders do not coincide with territorial or administrative borders, the true 
extent of Puntland’s western territory remains unsettled.53 Finally, while 
Puntland vows to rejoin Somalia upon federalization,
54
 its government 
quickly renounced the recent unilateral extension of Somalia’s current 
parliament,
55
 further weakening regional ties between the two polities.
56
  
In summary, disparate territorial clan membership and relics of 
European imperialism have resulted in divergent identities among 
Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia. These ethnic and regional 
differences grew to become the seeds of conflict that contributed to both 
the outbreak of the Somali civil war and the subsequent break-up of 
Somalia into three distinct political entities: a dysfunctional nation-state, a 
semi-autonomous regional state, and an independently governed quasi-
state.  
 
 
its own government and legal system. Id; see also BRADBURY, supra note 33, at 129 (“[T]he Puntland 
Charter affirms the unity of Somalia.”); WELLER, supra note 36, at 283–84. 
 52. Darod clan members, rather than the SSDF, formally adopted the Puntland Charter. WELLER, 
supra note 36, at 283. As such, clan identity is far more distinctive than party affiliation in Puntland. 
Markus V. Hoehne, Mimesis and Mimicry in Dynamics of State and Identity Formation in Northern 
Somalia, 79 J. INT’L AFR. INST. 252, 265 (2009) (“[P]eople in the north-east usually refer to 
themselves as Harti, if they wish to stress any political allegiance.”). 
 53. See BRONS, supra note 13, at 275 (“To apply the criteria of Harti clan affiliation for a 
delimitation of Puntland is rather problematic, as the territories inhabited by the Warsangeli and 
Dulbahante stretch into the Sool and Sanaag regions that are an integral part of Somaliland.”); 
BRADBURY, supra note 33, at 197–98 (“The dispute over [Puntland], where the political affiliations of 
the Harti clans are divided three ways between Somliland, Puntland and Somalia, has been described 
as ‘one of the deepest fault lines in contemporary Somali politics.’”); see also infra notes 129–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 54. Puntland has competing policy considerations inherent in maintaining regional autonomy and 
preparing for future absorption into a federalized Somali State. The government has enumerated these 
three basic policy objectives:  
(1) [T]o save Puntland territory and waters from the hostilities created by the absence of 
central government and confrontations of political factions serving negative interests (2) to be 
part of the pursuit to restore a Somali central authority based on a federal system, the only 
system that would prevent totalitarianism and dismemberment and (3) to cooperate with the 
international community to find a solution to the Somali crisis in general and to support the 
reconstruction and development in Puntland in particular. 
Mohamoud Muse Hersi, Puntland Government Policy Statement, SOMALITALK (Mar. 22, 2008), 
available at http://www.somalitalk.com/oil/plpolicy.html (quoted in WELLER, supra note 36, at 286–
87). 
 55. See supra note 10; infra note 56. 
 56. Puntland’s Cabinet of Ministers issued a decision stating that “[t]he Puntland Government 
will not accept any decision adopted by the TFG [Transitional Federal Government] Parliament [of 
Somalia] . . . . Therefore, the Puntland Government condemns and opposes the unreasonable term-
extension by the TFG Parliament, which leads to a new political disorder in Somalia.” Somalia: 
Puntland Government Denounces Unilateral Term-Extension of TFG Parliament, GAROWE ONLINE 
(Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://somalitalk.com/2011/02/08/pl-2/.  
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II. QUASI-STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Quasi-states
57
 are states that are “not accepted by the international 
community as legitimate [because they have] seceded from a recognized 
state that does not accept this loss of territory.”58 The Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States sets forth four requirements 
for statehood: “a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, 
and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.”59 While quasi-
states do generally have a fixed population and in many instances may 
have a functioning government,
60
 their territorial boundaries are disputed 
as illegal,
61
 and recognized states refuse to engage in normal international 
relations with them.
62
 Because quasi-states are unable to engage in such 
diplomatic discourse with recognized states, including their parent states, 
they are unable to pass treaties that define and stabilize their boundaries. 
According to the ICJ’s governing statute, “only states may be parties in 
cases before the Court.”63 Because quasi-states are not considered proper 
“states,” they are unable to participate as a legal party in the Court 
system.
64
 As such, quasi-states are denied both contractual (i.e. treaty-
based) and judicial remedies concerning border resolution. Recognized 
states, however, are able to petition the Court for an advisory opinion on 
any matter, and could therefore request an opinion regarding a quasi-state 
that has attempted to secede from its parent state.
65
 If the Court accepted 
such an advisory opinion request, it could gather evidence through 
 
 
 57. “These political entities are referred to by various names: ‘de facto states’, ‘unrecognized 
states’, ‘para-states’, [and] ‘pseudo-states’.” Pal Kolsto, The Sustainability and Future of 
Unrecognized Quasi-States, 43 J. PEACE RESEARCH 723, 723 (2006). They can also be referred to as 
“contested states.” GELDENHUYS, supra note 14, at 23. 
 58. Kolsto, supra note 57, at 724. Kolsto discusses further criteria for classification as a quasi-
state: “Its leadership must be in control of (most of) the territory it lays claim to, and it must have 
sought but not achieved international recognition as an independent state.” Id. at 725–26. 
 59. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp. 
 60. See GELDENHUYS, supra note 14, at 23. 
 61. “Since [a quasi-state’s] right of existence as separate, independent states is challenged, their 
borders are not internationally recognized as legal and legitimate frontiers separating them from other 
states. Instead, the territories in contention are widely regarded as integral parts of existing states.” Id. 
 62. Id. at 24. 
 63. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (emphasis added). 
 64. See id. 
 65. “The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever 
body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a 
request.” Id. art. 65, para. 1. The statute does not limit the subject of an advisory opinion to those 
involving recognized states, as it merely requires “any legal question.” Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
826 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:817 
 
 
 
 
communication with political members of the quasi-state,
66
 and in some 
cases, it could eventually rule on both the sovereignty of a newly formed 
de facto state and the integrity of its borders.
67 
III. BORDER-RESOLVING MECHANISMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL  
COURT OF JUSTICE 
According to the ICJ Statute, the Court will analyze disputes based on 
several broad principles. The most important of these principles are 
treaties, and to a lesser extent, international custom.
68
 No legally effective 
treaties recognized by international actors, however, pertain to quasi-
states. Therefore, quasi-states must rely on other theories, namely uti 
possidetis and effective control.
69 
A. The Evolution of Uti Possidetis 
The modern doctrine of uti possidetis derives from the ancient Roman 
law of jus civile, in which it was termed “uti possidetis ita possidetis,” 
 
 
 66. Id. art. 66, para. 2. “The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct 
communication, notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or International organization 
considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the President, as likely to be able to furnish 
information on the question . . . .” One scholar noted that “[t]he ICJ has ‘embraced a functional 
reading of [the above provision] that regulates the participation of states and international 
organizations in advisory proceedings, so as to encompass within it the category of quasi-states.’” 
Yuval Shany, In Defence of Functional Interpretation of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute: A Response 
to Yael Ronen, 8 J. INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE 329, 335 (2010). 
 67. The ICJ was recently petitioned to render an advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence. In its opinion, the Court stated that “[g]eneral international law contains no applicable 
prohibition of declarations of independence —Declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did 
not violate general international law.” Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, at 3 (July 22), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf. 
 68. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1 (“The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; [and] b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law . . . .”). 
 69. This Note will employ a mode of analysis similar to that of Professor Shaw where he posits 
four types of claims for legal ownership of territory: historical, ethnic, geographic, and economic. 
SHAW, supra note 17, at 192–96. While Shaw discounts the weight of geographic claims generally, in 
the case of Somalia, geography is inexorably intertwined with ethnic considerations due to territorial 
clan distribution. See id. at 195 (“The fact that [geographic claims have not been used to a large extent 
in Africa] . . . reinforces the acceptance of colonial borders.”). I will therefore discuss “ethnic” and 
“geographic” claims under the concept of effective control and “historical” claims under the doctrine 
of uti possidetis. Effective control may also be referred to as “effectivités.” See infra note 111 and 
accompanying text. 
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meaning “as you possess, so you possess.”70 Although the widespread 
utilization of the doctrine for border demarcation matters began with Latin 
American Creole independence from Spanish rule,
71
 the doctrine had been 
articulated as early as 1810.
72
 Once independent, the Creole sought to 
occupy the lands that they currently inhabited
73
 to prevent them from 
being classified as terra nullius.
74
 In order to administer the division of 
territory efficiently, the Creole decided to adopt the borders of the 
European colonies that preceded them.
75
 Thus, the newly independent 
Creole states effectively “had achieved the status of being recognizable 
international entities.”76 There were several disputes, however, between 
the newly formed states regarding border demarcation. Specifically, it was 
disputed whether exercising jurisdiction beyond a state’s colonial borders 
prior to independence should result in post-colonial absorption of that 
territory.
77
 Those who thought that “administrative possession” of an area 
warranted absorption into the state regardless of colonial boundaries used 
the term uti possidetis de facto. Those who restricted territory to legally-
 
 
 70. Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination: An 
Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 503, 508 (2008). “[T]he object of the 
interdict was to recognize the status quo in any given dispute involving immovable property, and was 
therefore designed to protect existing arrangements of possession without regard to the merits of the 
dispute.” Id. at 508. For a detailed history of the Roman law jus civile in relation to uti possidetis, see 
JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL 
ANALYSIS 29–56 (2003). 
 71. See Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 
90 AM. J. INT’L L. 590, 593 (1996) (“The juxtaposition of uti possidetis and self-determination began 
in Latin America, where the Creoles who wrested independence from their Spanish brethren beginning 
in the early nineteenth century seized upon the idea as a way of setting boundaries of the new 
countries.”). 
 72. SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 
(1997) (“The doctrine of uti possidetis [was] enunciated as early as 1810 . . . .”). 
 73. See Ratner, supra note 71, at 593 (“To Creole leadership, adoption of a policy of uti 
possidetis served . . . to ensure that no land in South America remained terra nullius upon [Creole] 
independence . . . .”). The Creole wanted to solidify their occupation of land in order to prevent further 
European hegemony in Latin America. If they did not install a legal system for division of land, the 
area could legally be permanently colonized by other states. CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 70, at 
63–64; see also SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD: THE 
ROLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS 24–29 (2002) (discussing territorial disputes between Spain, Portugal, and 
Brazil).  
 74. Terra nullius is a legal doctrine that “designate[s] territory that was ‘empty’ and therefore 
free for colonization . . . .” CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 70, at 3. However, “it is no longer 
considered a feasible and reasonable doctrine for all practical purposes.” Id. 
 75. “In the immediate aftermath of independence, the new international actors had merely 
decided to define their national territory by reference to the particular colonial divisions that the 
fortunes of war and the power of negotiations had included within their jurisdiction.” LALONDE, supra 
note 73, at 30. 
 76. CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 70, at 65. 
 77. LALONDE, supra note 73, at 31 (“The existence of [the two rival versions of the uti possidetis 
principle] rendered its application problematic . . . .”). 
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titled colonial borders, in contrast, used the term uti possidetis juris.
78
 It is 
from this basic history, developed and extended through future 
implementations, that the modern doctrine of uti possidetis is derived, 
explaining that “states emerging from decolonization shall presumptively 
inherit the colonial administrative borders that they held at the time of 
independence.”79 
The legal mechanism of uti possidetis proved to be very useful for 
African decolonization, though it was hotly contested early on. After 
establishing the temporary demarcation based on colonial boundaries, 
several African conferences were held to discuss the administration of 
territory and borders. In 1958, the All-Africa People’s Conference 
specifically rejected colonial boundaries in favor of ethnically divided 
territories with its resolution, “Frontiers, Boundaries, and Federations.”80 
While this seemed to be the initial reaction of most African states, they 
eventually realized and emphasized in the resolution “the necessity of 
working within the framework of the territorial integrity of States and of 
respecting the colonial boundaries.”81 As such, the Organization of African 
Unity (“OAU”) finally met in 1964 to discuss the future treatment of 
border disputes and declared that colonial borders were to effectively 
remain in perpetuity and would be controlling in any future legal action 
among African states.
82
  
 
 
 78. Essentially, the parties were disputing whether territory should be measured by physical 
possession (de facto) or legal title (juris). Id. This argument came to the forefront in a border dispute 
between the Spanish republics, who argued for uti possidetis juris, and Portuguese Brazil, who argued 
for uti possidetis de facto. Id. Because there were no legal treaties in effect to reference, Brazil’s de 
facto form of the principle was administered. Id.; see also Ratner, supra note 71, at 594 (“[S]tates and 
scholars seemed to have different views on the meaning of uti possidetis as of a particular date, leading 
to the use of two new terms, uti possidetis juris and uti possidetis facto.”). 
 79. Ratner, supra note 71, at 590. 
 80. “The third part of the resolution denounced the artificial frontiers drawn by the imperialist 
powers, particularly those which cut across ethnic lines and divided peoples of the same stock, and 
called for the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date.” SHAW, supra note 17, at 183. 
The Pan-African Congress came to a similar conclusion in 1945, stating ‘“the artificial divisions and 
territorial boundaries created by the imperialist powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the political 
unity of the West African peoples.’” Id. at 183 (quoting HISTORY OF THE PAN-AFRICAN CONGRESS 55 
(George Padmore ed., 1963)). 
 81. SHAW, supra note 17, at 184. 
 82. “Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissention . . . 
[and] that the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality 
. . . [The OAU] solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders 
existing on their achievement of national independence.” Organization of African Unity, AHG/Res. 
16(I), Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government Held in Cairo, UAR (July 17–21, 1964), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/ 
Documents/Decisions/hog/bHoGAssembly1964.pdf. 
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Finally, the utilization of uti possidetis was significantly broadened 
beyond decolonization matters following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 
the early 1990s. An arbitration commission known as “The Badinter 
Commission” was tasked with the administration of stabilizing the newly 
ceded territory.
83
 During the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, the 
Commission concluded that “the former boundaries [must] become 
frontiers protected by international law.”84 It then specifically invoked the 
term “uti possidetis” and stated that even though it had historically been 
used for decolonization,
85
 the doctrine “[applied] all the more readily to 
the Republics,”86 though many scholars disagree with this contention.87  
B. ICJ Jurisprudence and Uti Possidetis 
The ICJ explained its position on uti possidetis most effectively in 
1986, when it resolved a border dispute between Burkina Faso and the 
Republic of Mali.
88
 In their petition to the Court, the States themselves 
invoked the principle of uti possidetis, evidencing the doctrine’s 
acceptance among African States.
89
 The dispute was brought to court 
because the territory in question was of particular importance, as it was 
“the largest of the temporary watercourses in the region.”90  
 
 
 83. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 70, at 159 (“[T]he Badinter Commission’s original 
mandate was to draw up a constitution for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would enable the 
peaceful co-existence within the state of different threatening and threatened national minorities.”). 
For a detailed analysis of the Commission, see STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 
AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS 
IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (2000). 
 84. Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3 (Jan. 11, 1992), reprinted 
in 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1500 (1992) [hereinafter Opinion No. 3]. 
 85. Id. (“This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and, in 
particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis, though initially applied in settling 
decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle, as stated by 
the International Court of Justice in its Judgment of 22 December 1986 in the case between Burkina 
Faso and Mali.”); see also TERRETT, supra note 83, at 156 (discussing the principle of uti possidetis in 
the Burkina Faso/Mali Case). 
 86. Opinion No. 3, supra note 84, at 1499–1500. 
 87. See Michla Pomerance, The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International 
Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence, 20 MICH J. INT’L L. 31 (1998). 
 88. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). 
 89. The two states, “[d]esiring to achieve as rapidly as possible a settlement of the frontier 
dispute between them, based in particular on respect for the principle of the intangibility of frontiers 
inhered from colonization, and to effect the definitive delimitation and demarcation of their common 
frontier . . . .” Id. at 557. 
 90. Id. at 562. 
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The Court laid out its authoritative description of uti possidetis, stating: 
The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing 
respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when 
independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no 
more than delimitations between different administrative divisions 
or colonies all subject to the same sovereign. In that case, the 
application of the principle of uti possidetis resulted in 
administrative boundaries being transformed into international 
frontiers in the full sense of the term.
91
 
The Court then discussed the importance of uti possidetis, deeming it “a 
general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of 
obtaining independence, wherever it occurs”92 and one of the Court’s 
“most important legal principles.”93 It further explained that the doctrine 
should be flexibly applied in a variety of circumstances among several 
types of international territories.
94
 The ICJ also specifically dispelled the 
argument that the ethnic composition of a territory could singularly 
overrule uti possidetis juris.
95
 
Because the two states had been part of French West Africa, the Court 
applied French colonial law
96
 and concluded that the evidence provided 
was not sufficient to establish a strong legal claim on either side.
97
 Thus, 
the Court employed principles of equity and divided the territory equally.
98
 
The importance of the case lies primarily in the Court’s definition of uti 
possidetis and its dicta proclaiming the doctrine’s prominence in resolving 
border disputes. 
 
 
 
 91. Id. at 566. 
 92. Id. at 565. 
 93. Id. at 567. 
 94. Id. at 566 (“The territorial boundaries which have to be respected may also derive from 
international frontiers which previously divided a colony of one State from a colony of another, or 
indeed a colonial territory from the territory of an independent State, or one which was under 
protectorate, but had retained its international personality.”).  
 95. Id. at 633 (“Especially in the African context, the obvious deficiencies of many frontiers 
inherited from colonization, from the ethnic . . . standpoint, cannot support an assertion that the 
modification of these frontiers is necessary or justifiable on the ground of considerations of equity.”).  
 96. Id. at 568. 
 97. Id. at 587–88 (“[T]he Chamber must emphasize that the present case is a decidedly unusual 
one as concerns the facts which have to be proven and the evidence which has been, or might have 
been, produced for this purpose . . . . [T]he rejection of any particular argument on the ground that the 
factual allegations on which it is based have not been proved is not sufficient to warrant upholding the 
contrary argument.”).  
 98. Id. at 633. 
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Another important piece of uti possidetis jurisprudence occurred in a 
1992 dispute between El Salvador and Honduras.
99
 The countries 
petitioned the Court to determine which territory contained the Gulf of 
Fonesca and its islands based on Spanish colonial borders.
100
 The Court 
referred to the definition of uti possidetis set forth in Burkina Faso, calling 
it the authoritative statement of the principle.
101
 El Salvador based its 
arguments on the theory of uti possidetis de facto because of its exercise of 
sovereignty over the territory,
102
 while Honduras relied upon the theory of 
uti possidetis juris and its legal administrative boundaries.
103
 The Court 
ruled for El Salvador, seemingly favoring the doctrine of uti possidetis de 
facto over uti possidetis juris, though this was primarily because the 
evidence was insufficient to accurately determine proper legal title.
104
  
The Court also analyzed the “critical date” on which to apply uti 
possidetis.
105
 It stated that while the date of independence is traditionally 
applied as the critical date, if the parties later agree on a variation of the 
original boundaries set at independence, then a new critical date is 
established.
106
 As such, any subsequent border disputes would be analyzed 
in relation to the previously agreed-upon borders. 
 
 
 99. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11). 
 100. Id. at 362–63. 
 101. Id. at 386–87; see supra text accompanying note 88. 
 102. Id. at 563. El Salvador maintains uti possidetis de facto ownership based on “effective 
possession of the islands as the basis of its sovereignty . . . .” Id. at 558. 
 103. Id. at 558. 
 104. “[W]hile the uti possidetis juris position in 1821 cannot be satisfactorily ascertained on the 
basis of colonial titles and effectivités, the fact that El Salvador . . . [was] in effective possession and 
control of the island, justifies the conclusion that El Salvador may be regarded as sovereign over the 
island.” Id. at 579.  
 105. Id. at 401. Critical dates are the dates on which borders are to be measured by the Court and 
can result from many events. L.F.E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1251, 1256 
(1963) (“A situation may be brought into focus, and a critical date result, from the convergence of a 
Peace Treaty, the demarcation of a frontier, a general agreement of recognition, a guarantee of 
frontiers, with the unilateral acts of the claimant State which had, previously, been sufficient only to 
establish an inchoate title, or to assert a provisional or tentative claim.”). At times, however, there are 
competing incidents that make determination of the critical date difficult. For instance, during the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Badinter Commission was required to resolve exactly when the 
resulting States became legally independent. Conference on Yugoslavia, Commission Opinion No. 11 
(July 16, 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1587, 1587 (1993). This was a complex issue, as several of the 
States had seceded, not necessarily legally, prior to the formal dissolution of Yugoslavia. Thus, the 
Commission was forced to determine distinct individual independence dates for each new State. See 
TERRETT, supra note 83, at 225–28 (discussing Opinion 11 and its dealings with the dates of 
succession of several States after the dissolution of Yugoslavia). 
 106. El Sal./Hond., 1992 I.C.J. at 401 (“The principle of uti possidetis juris is sometimes stated in 
almost absolute terms, suggesting that the position at the date of independence is always determinative 
. . . . A later critical date clearly may arise, for example, either from adjudication or from a boundary 
treaty . . . where there is sufficient evidence to show that the parties have in effect clearly accepted a 
variation, or at least an interpretation, of the uti possidetis juris position.”).  
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The most recent implementation of uti possidetis by the ICJ occurred in 
2005 between Benin and Niger.
107
 The Court, again citing its definition in 
Burkina Faso,
108
 was petitioned to determine the proper French colonial 
boundary
109
 with regard to the River Niger.
110
 Similar to the El 
Salvador/Honduras case, the Court discussed the applicability of effective 
control in relation to uti possidetis juris.
111
 Both administrative boundaries 
and effective control favored Benin, and the Court situated the boundary 
such that Benin retained the River and the disputed islands.
112
 
C. Supplementary Arguments: Effective Control (Effectivites) 
In addition to the ICJ deferring to acts of sovereignty through its 
acceptance of uti possidetis de facto in the El Salvador/Honduras case, the 
Court had previously applied a variation of the doctrine in a dispute 
between France and the United Kingdom.
113
 The two countries petitioned 
the Court to determine “sovereignty over the islets and rocks . . . of the 
Minquiers and Ecrehos groups,”114 which are located between France and 
the British Island of Jersey.
115
 Because the dispute did not involve a newly 
independent post-colonial state, the Court could not employ uti possidetis 
and instead sought to ascertain which country more effectively exercised 
sovereign occupation over the territory.
116
 The Court implicitly invoked a 
hierarchical analysis in which treaty evidence was deemed most 
 
 
 107. See Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), 2005 I.C.J. 90 (July 12). 
 108. Id. at 108. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 90. 
 111. The Court does not invoke the doctrine of “uti possidetis de facto” but uses the term “post-
colonial effectivités,” stating that “both Parties have on occasion sought to confirm the legal title which 
they claim by relying on acts whereby their authorities allegedly exercised sovereignty over the 
disputed territories . . . .” Id. at 109. Uti possidetis de facto references effective control over the 
territory at the time of independence, while effectivités is measured after independence is achieved. See 
Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of 
International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 62–63 (2010). 
 112. Benin v. Niger, 2005 I.C.J. 90, 161–63 (July 12). 
 113. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17). 
 114. Id. at 49. 
 115. Id. at 53. 
 116. Both Great Britain and France claimed an “ancient or original title” to the territory, and as 
such, the Court was first required to look to treaties for reconciliation of the two claims. Id. at 53. 
However, “[c]ommon to all these Treaties is the fact that they did not specify which islands were held 
by the Kings of England and France respectively.” Id. at 54. Both parties also contradictorily claimed 
feudal title to the territory, and as such, the Court decided to examine “not indirect presumptions 
deduced from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession of 
the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups.” Id. at 57. 
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persuasive.
117
 Effective control arguments were only considered when 
prior treaty (or uti possidetis) evidence was inadequate or contradictory.
118
 
The United Kingdom provided evidence that they administered judicial 
proceedings,
119
 fishing boat registry,
120
 property sales,
121
 and also engaged 
in construction in the territory.
122
 Taken together, and in connection with a 
legislative act that claimed control over the Ecrehos,
123
 the Court viewed 
these acts as continuous acts of sovereignty and gave legal title to the 
United Kingdom.
124
  
More recently, in a dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria,
125
 the ICJ 
accepted evidence of similar acts of sovereignty
126
 and also considered 
ethnic composition of the territory in its ruling for Nigeria.
127
 Thus, both 
 
 
 117. The Court began by examining legal title, and when deemed insufficient, examined 
possessory evidence as a backstop. See id. at 53–57; see also Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11) (“The Chamber has no doubt that the starting-point 
for the determination of sovereignty over the islands must be the uti possidetis juris of 1821.”). 
 118. Minquiers (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. at 57; see also Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou 
Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 428 (1992) (“In general, uti possidetis 
has succeeded in Africa against claims based on historical, ethnic, geographical, or economic 
considerations, because the adjustment of boundaries based on these other principles threatens to 
destabilize governments.”); Mahmud, supra note 111, at 63 (“Uti posidetis [sic] combined with 
critical date as a legal concept trumps conflicting post-colonial assertion and exercise of effective 
authority as grounds for sovereign title under the doctrine of effectivites. Post-colonial effectivites has 
significance only if colonial practice fails to furnish definitive demarcation and thus trigger application 
of uti possedetis [sic].”). As such, if there are no treaties in effect for uti possidetis juris or evidence of 
pre-independence administrative control for uti possidetis de facto, effective control and effectivités 
will be referenced. 
 119. “Jersey courts have exercised criminal jurisdiction in respect of the Ecrehos during nearly a 
hundred years.” Minquiers (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. at 65. The territory also “required the holding of an 
inquest on corpses found within the Bailiwick where it was not clear that death was due to natural 
causes.” Id. 
 120. “[A]n official of [Jersey] Island visited occasionally the Ecrehos for the purpose of endorsing 
the license of that boat.” Id. The Court accepts this evidence as a contributory factor to effective 
control of the area, even though the boating registration was only for one boat owned by one man. Id.  
 121. Id. at 65–66. 
 122. Id. at 66. 
 123. The British Treasury Warrant of 1875 included the “Ecrehou Rocks” within Jersey’s (and 
thereby Britain’s) limits prior to their dispute with France. Id. 
 124. Id. at 66 (“These various facts show that Jersey authorities have in several ways exercised 
ordinary local administration in respect of the Ecrehos during a long period of time.”). At the time, 
Jersey was a port of the Channel Islands and as such was under British rule. Id. Thus, the Court found 
the territory to be “an integral part of the fief of the Channel Islands which were held by the English 
King . . . [and] that British authorities during the greater part of the nineteenth century and in the 
twentieth century have exercised State functions in respect of the group.” Id. at 67. 
 125. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002 
I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10). 
 126. Id. at 486 (“[S]overeign acts, such as tax collection, census-taking, the provision of education 
and public health services.”).  
 127. Id. (“[T]his long-established Nigerian administration of the territory, the permanent 
population, the significant affiliations of a Nigerian character, do substantiate a claim . . . .”). 
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ethnic affiliation and administration of State functions in the territory can 
in some cases imply legal sovereignty and title over land,
128
 an argument 
that is inexorably linked to post-colonial African nations.  
IV. FRAMING THE SOMALILAND-PUNTLAND DISPUTE THROUGH THE LENS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
The “SSC region,” comprised of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn,129 “has been 
described as ‘one of the deepest fault lines in contemporary Somali 
politics.’”130 The region is located between Somaliland (to the West) and 
Puntland (to the East), with both “States” laying claim to it. The most 
recent bouts of violence were in part due to the recent Somaliland 
presidential election, when troops from Somaliland, Puntland, and 
Ethiopia clashed in Sool.
131
 Just one day prior, a judicial official was 
assassinated in the same region.
132
 To stabilize the region by minimizing 
skirmishes over territorial ownership, it is necessary to determine whether 
SSC inhabitants are located within the boundaries of Somaliland or 
Puntland.
133 
Utilizing the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, the boundary between 
Somaliland and Puntland should be adopted from its previous colonial 
boundaries, i.e., between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. Because 
the two colonies were originally granted independence separately, the 
border between the two can be easily ascertained from historical maps.
134
 
And because Puntland is technically an autonomous region of Somalia, its 
 
 
 128. But see supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 129. See infra Map 3, p. 843, printed in Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, Somalia 
(Political) 2002, UNIV. OF TEXAS LIBRARIES, available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/so 
malia_pol_2002.pdf. 
 130. BRADBURY, supra note 33, at 197 (citing SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS, ICG AFRICA REPORT N°66, at 30 (2003)). 
 131. Qalinle Hussein, Somaliland Army Clashes with Militia, Five Dead, SOMALILAND PRESS 
(July 20, 2010), http://www.somalilandpress.com/somaliland-army-clashes-with-militia-five-dead-
17144; see also Abdiqani Baynax, Somaliland’s New President Ahmed Mohamoud’s First Speech to 
Somaliland Citizens, SOMALILAND PRESS (July 29, 2010), http://somalilandpress.com/somalilands-
new-president-ahmed-mohamouds-first-speech-to-somaliland-citizens-17378. 
 132. See Hussein, supra note 131. 
 133. Several villages in the SSC region between Somaliland and Puntland are in dispute and have 
hosted clashes between opposing forces. For example, in February, Puntland clan militias attacked a 
Somaliland controlled village in the region. Eight Killed in Disputed Somali Village, AFP (Feb. 7, 
2011), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gsy3YUo9x3Lpjon3hF7EXG2-l1Cw 
?docId=CNG.2c5a19790e1a96031e65d4fdf8d64cdc.3d1. 
 134. See infra Maps 2(A)–(B), p. 842. 
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borders should correspond exactly to those of Somalia, regardless of its 
self-imposed autonomy.
135
 
When Somaliland became independent in 1960, its borders were 
clearly demarcated based on its previous borders as a British 
Protectorate.
136
 The British map draws its eastern border at the 49th 
meridian,
137
 which is confirmed by the western Somaliland border set at 
the 49th meridian of the Italian Map.
138
 According to these colonial 
administrative boundaries at the time of independence,
139
 the SSC region 
is within Somaliland’s borders, since both Sanaag’s and Sool’s eastern 
borders (Cayn does not lie on Puntland’s borders as it is the westernmost 
portion of the SSC)
140
 also lie on the 49th meridian.
141
 Based purely on an 
uti possidetis juris evidentiary standpoint, Somaliland should have title to 
the SSC region because it was originally a part of the British Somaliland 
Protectorate. Puntland can refute these claims by exhibiting the Act of 
Union, in which both Somaliland and Somalia merged in 1960.
142
 The Act 
could be construed as evidence that both states agreed to alter the location 
of their respective boundaries, consequently creating a new critical date at 
the formation of the single unified Somalia state.
143
 Based on uti 
possidetis, this implies that there are in fact no international borders 
between Puntland and Somaliland .
144
 
Puntland could also appeal to ethnic uniformity to strengthen its critical 
date proposition, though this alone has never succeeded in ICJ 
jurisprudence.
145
 Citing the Benin/Niger case as ICJ precedent
146
 and the 
 
 
 135. Furthermore, the ICJ had previously stated that uti possidetis should be invoked in a great 
number of circumstances regarding several different political entities. See supra note 94 and 
accompanying text. Accordingly, while an autonomous region such as Puntland has yet to bring forth 
such a dispute, it is likely that such entities would be within the broad purview of territories that the 
ICJ would subject to uti possidetis. 
 136. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra Map 2(A), p. 842. 
 138. See infra Map 2(B), p. 842. 
 139. In the final report on colonial Somaliland compiled by British authorities, the attached map 
confirms the Inter-Territorial eastern boundary running along the 49th meridian. See SOMALILAND 
PROTECTORATE REPORT FOR 1958, supra note 26. 
 140. See infra Map 3, p. 843. 
 141. The Colonial borders were delimited with the British occupying the western Burao territory 
and the Italians occupying the eastern Majertain territory. BRONS, supra note 13, at 13. After the 1975 
territory restructuring, the former British territory would have comprised the administrative regions of 
Sanaag, Sool, Todger, Awdal, and Djibouti. Id. at 16. As such, prior to the Somali civil war, the SSC 
region was administratively located in modern-day Somaliland. 
 142. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 144. Somaliland could provide evidence of insufficient voting on the Act of Union referendum in 
an attempt to refute this argument. See supra note 33. 
 145. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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All-Africa People’s Conference147 as historical justification, Puntland 
could present disparate clan distribution evidence demonstrating that 
Puntland is composed solely of the Harti sub-clan, while Somaliland is 
composed of the Isaq clan.
148
 The most populous clan in the Sool and 
Sanaag regions is Harti, and Puntland can therefore argue that tribal clan 
membership puts the SSC region within its “ethnic” borders.149 
Further, Puntland issued a press release shortly after becoming 
autonomous stating that it intended to include Sool and Sanaag as part of 
its territory.
150
 However, the inhabitants of those regions are politically 
divided between allegiance to Somaliland and Puntland,
151
 as clan families 
in the region have held administrative offices in both governments.
152
 
Puntland may have slightly greater popular support in the SSC region
153
 
because of the aforementioned clan ties, though the Puntland government 
has recently disenfranchised several elders.
154
 Conversely, there are some 
within the region who advocate for the SSC to be an autonomous region in 
 
 
 146. See supra notes 107–12 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. But see supra note 82 and accompanying text 
regarding the OAU Conference. 
 148. BRONS, supra note 13, at 15. The Isaq clan territory in Somaliland cuts off west of the SSC 
region. See infra Map 1(A), p. 840. 
 149. BRONS, supra note 13, at 276; see infra Maps 1(A), 1(B), 3, pp. 840–41, 843 (comparing clan 
territory to current Somali territories, Somaliland, and Puntland). The Harti clan is broken down into 
several subgroups. See supra note 16. The subgroups in the SSC region are primarily Warsangeeli and 
Dhulbahante, while Puntland’s territory is comprised of the Majeerteen. Thus, while the SSC region 
and Puntland do share the same parent tribe (Harti), they are still somewhat divided. Regardless, based 
on parental lineage alone, the Harti still dominate both the SSC region and Puntland. Hoehne, supra 
note 8. 
 150. BRONS, supra note 13, at 276. This compares to the British Treasury Warrant of 1875 that 
claimed Ecrehos as part of its territory, which the court included as evidence for supporting Great 
Britain. Unlike Great Britain, however, Puntland knew at the time that the SSC territory was disputed. 
See supra note 123. Further, Article 1.3 of the Charter for Puntland State of Somalia does not mention 
claiming the SSC region as its territory. BRONS, supra note 13, at 276. 
 151. This is primarily due to ethnic membership, as it is “the clan elders of the Dulbahante clans 
in Sool and Sanag [sic] [who] remain divided.” BRONS, supra note 13, at 276–77. 
 152. See Hoehne, supra note 8 (“[D]hulbahante and Warsangeeli had representatives in both of 
the regional administrations of Somaliland and of Puntland.”). Some Harti clan members still maintain 
allegiance to southern Somalia and its capital Mogadishu. Thus, the Harti clan is torn between all three 
political entities: Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland. ICG AFRICA REPORT N°66, supra note 130, at 
28–29 (“[H]arti loyalties are split at least three ways, with members of the clan’s political and 
traditional elite scattered between Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu.”). 
 153. David H. Shinn, Africa Notes: Somaliland: The Little Country that Could, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES (Nov. 2002), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/ anotes_0211.pdf (“It 
is generally agreed that about half of the residents of Sanaag and a higher proportion in Sool have 
sympathies with Puntland.”).  
 154. Somalia: Las Anod Clan Elders ‘Give Up’ on Puntland Govt, GAROWE ONLINE (June 8, 
2008, 8:52 AM), http://allafrica.com/stories/200806090032.html. This was in response to Puntland’s 
lack of local support following Somaliland’s seizure of Sanaag’s capital. See infra notes 159–61 and 
accompanying text. 
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and of itself.
155
 It would likely be difficult, however, to effectively 
maintain and police the area with both Somaliland and Puntland disputing 
the territory
156
 while also lacking a credible legal claim.
157 
Puntland can make a final argument based on effective control or 
effectivités, as the autonomous territory first began to utilize State 
functions in the SSC region in the early 2000s
158
 until the Sool capital was 
seized by Somaliland.
159
 Similarly, because of the Harti clan distribution, 
Puntland could argue that its “citizens” (Harti clan members) were 
effectively occupying and administering the territory as an ethnic majority 
at the time of independence and beyond, even though it was technically 
within British Somaliland’s borders.160 Since the capital was overtaken, 
however, Somaliland has been under effective control of the territory.
161
 
Regardless, violent acquisition of the region will not provide proper legal 
title because the territory has always been within some formulation of 
Somali borders, and thus, it is not considered terra nullius.
162
  
 
 
 155. Several SSC political leaders recently met in Nairobi to discuss the possibility of a separate 
administration apart from Somaliland and Puntland. Liban Ahmad, Sool, Sanaag and Cayn 
Leadership: Some challenges and opportunities, WARDHEER NEWS (Oct. 31, 2009), http://wardheer 
news.com/Articles_09/Oct/31_sool_sanaag_liban.pdf. 
 156. Both the Somaliland and Puntland administrations have begun efforts to weaken plans for 
independent SSC leadership brought forth at the Nairobi Conference. Id. 
 157. Those pushing for SSC autonomy have only an ethnic composition argument, in that their 
sub-clans are all uniform. They were never a separate State, nor a separate administrative colony like 
Somaliland. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. Therefore, they would have no uti 
possidetis claims whatsoever. 
 158. Hoehne, supra note 8, at 3 (“[Puntland] took serious steps to establish an effective military 
and then civilian administration [in Sool] in early 2004.”). Puntland police officials also worked in 
SSC police stations as early as 1999. Patrick Gilkes, Briefing: Somalia, 98 AFR. AFFAIRS 571, 572 
(1999), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/723893. The actual enforcement and administration 
within the SSC region has been intermittent since the Somali civil war and primarily based on military 
advantage. Prior to 2002, “few politicians from [Somaliland’s Capital] Hargeysa or [Puntland’s 
Capital] Garoowe ever visited” the region. Markus V. Hoehne, People & Politics along & across the 
Somaliland-Puntland Border, in BORDERS & BORDERLANDS AS RESOURCES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
103 (Dereje Feyissa & Markus V. Hoehne eds., 2010). After a clash between Somaliland and Puntland 
forces in 2002, the region “was left to the local powers” until December 2003. Markus V. Hoehne, Not 
Born as a De Facto State: Somaliland’s complicated state formation, in REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR HORN OF AFRICA 328 (Roba Sharamo & Berouk Mesfin eds., 2011). Following 
several military skirmishes, the region was effectively under Puntland’s control from 2004–2007. Id. at 
329. 
 159. Las Anod, the administrative capital of Sool, was successfully invaded by Somaliland forces 
on October 15, 2007. Faisal Roble, Somaliland: Is Invading Las Anod Part of Creating “New Reality 
on the Ground”?, WARDHEER NEWS (Oct. 22, 2007), http://wardheernews.com/articles_07/october/ 
21_Somaliland_Faisal_Roble.html. 
 160. See supra notes 52 and 141and accompanying text. 
 161. Id.  
 162. See supra notes 74 and 159 and accompanying text. 
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Consistent with ICJ jurisprudence, if there exists traceable evidence of 
colonial boundaries, then the application of uti possidetis juris according 
to those borders will nearly always prevail as the ruling evidence; ethnic 
composition and effective control arguments merely supplement the 
primary legal evidence.
163
 Accordingly, if Puntland successfully proves 
that the critical date of independence was the Act of Union and contradicts 
Somaliland’s uti possidetis evidence, then effective control and ethnic 
supplemental arguments could push the Court in Puntland’s favor. 
Conversely, if Somaliland can demonstrate that the Act of Union is 
illegitimate and the critical date is when British Somaliland alone became 
independent, then uti possidetis juris demands that the SSC region be 
within Somaliland’s borders. Because Somaliland is currently a quasi-state 
and not internationally recognized,
164
 however, it follows that the 
international community, and by extension the ICJ, considers the Act of 
Union to be legal. Puntland’s evidence, therefore, could very well 
convince the ICJ to defer to effective control and ethnic composition to 
put the SSC region within Puntland’s borders. 
CONCLUSION 
The international community has a demonstrated legitimate interest in 
stabilizing the one area that is generating hostility in an otherwise fairly 
peaceful northern Somalia. Solving the dispute can help quell the violence 
between Somaliland and Puntland while fostering democratic ideals that 
will hopefully spread into war-torn southern Somalia.
165
 Left in its current 
 
 
 163. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 164. Recognition of Somaliland may yet be on the horizon based on the recent Sudanese 
referendum results that granted Southern Sudan its long awaited independence, which could 
potentially improve Somaliland’s case. Following the referendum, the U.S. government announced 
that it would officially recognize Southern Sudan as a legitimate State. David Gollust, US Welcomes 
Sudan Referendum Results, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/eng 
lish/news/usa/US-Welcomes-Sudan-Referendum-Results-115518304.html (“The United States . . . 
welcomed the official results of the referendum in southern Sudan, and announced that it will 
recognize an independent Southern Sudanese state.”). 
 Somaliland Foreign Minister Mohamed A. Omar stated, “We will be using the South Sudan case 
to take a more aggressive policy to the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development.” William Davison, Somaliland to Push for Recognition After Sudan Referendum, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2011, 4:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-18/somaliland-to-
push-for-recognition-after-sudan-referendum.html. On the other hand, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister 
Hailemariam Desalegn believes this will have no effect on Somaliland because the situation is so 
different. Northern Sudan agreed to the South’s referendum, which Somalia is unable to do, as it has 
no “representative legitimate government in Mogadishu.” Id. 
 165. This process may already have commenced, as both Somaliland’s foreign minister and 
Puntland’s State Minister for International Cooperation recently attended an international conference 
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state, the lack of international recognition presents Somaliland with a 
unique problem because it is unable to seek a legal judgment of its border 
dispute with Puntland. Utilizing the jurisprudence of the ICJ, both 
Somaliland and Puntland have persuasive arguments based on uti 
possidetis. Puntland’s evidence that the Act of Union adjusts the critical 
date of independence in conjunction with effective control and ethnic 
uniformity, however, is the most convincing argument, providing it with 
rightful ownership of the SSC region at the present time. 
Michael Farrell  
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MAPS 1(A) & 1(B) 
 PRESENT-DAY SOMALILAND & PUNTLAND   SOMALIA CLAN TERRITORY 
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MAPS 2(A) & 2(B): BRITISH & ITALIAN COLONIAL BORDERS OF SOMALILAND 
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MAP 3: SOMALI TERRITORIES—2002 
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